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Abstract 
This paper examines the optimal licensing scheme when the number of licensees is determined endogenously. We 
demonstrate that a license holder obtains monopoly profit even if the license holder uses only a fixed fee as long as the 
marginal cost is constant. Furthermore, we show that under free entry of licensees, a license holder can obtain 
monopoly profit with any combination of a positive fixed fee and a unit royalty that satisfies a certain condition. Even 
if the fixed fee is regulated to be a certain level, a license holder can achieve monopoly profit by means of a unit 
royalty. This result is in contrast with that of a case where the number of licensees is exogenously determined.
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     1 Introduction
The optimal licensing scheme has been a matter of great concern for economic re-
searchers. A pioneering work in this regard is Kamien and Tauman (1986), who com-
pare a unit royalty scheme and a ￿xed fee scheme. They conclude that a ￿xed fee
scheme is optimal for license holders with Cournot competition of licensees. Further-
more, under a ￿xed fee scheme, a license holder earns monopoly pro￿t, with only one
licensee. The literature that extends Kamien and Tauman (1986) primarily focuses on
the case wherein the number of licensees is given exogenously.
This paper considers a licensing scheme wherein the number of licensees is endoge-
nously determined. A two-part tari⁄ scheme, i.e., a combination of ￿xed fee and unit
royalty schemes and a general demand function is considered. We show that if the mar-
ginal cost of production is constant, then a ￿xed fee continues to be su¢ cient for license
holders to earn monopoly pro￿t. More precisely, under free entry of licensees, a license
holder can obtain monopoly pro￿t with any combination of a positive ￿xed fee and a
unit royalty that satis￿es a certain condition. Our result shows that even if the demand
function is in a general form and the number of licensees is endogenously determined,
Kamien and Tauman￿ s main theorem is robust, i.e., a ￿xed fee scheme is su¢ cient for
a license holder to earn monopoly pro￿t. This is in a sharp contrast with the result of
de Meza (1986), who shows that a combination of ￿xed fee and positive unit royalty
schemes is necessary for earning monopoly pro￿t if the marginal cost of production is
increasing, not constant.1 Furthermore, as an extension of our basic model, we consider
the case where the ￿xed fee is regulated to be a certain level; we show that the optimal
unit royalty with a regulated ￿xed fee enables license holders to obtain monopoly pro￿t
even in this case.
In this paper, we extend a standard patent licensing model to the endogenous entry
environment. In the model, a license holder o⁄ers a licensing scheme for downstream
￿rms (e.g., producers). If downstream ￿rms buy licenses, then they employ the tech-
nology in their production processes. Downstream ￿rms engage in quantity-setting
competition. The license holder￿ s technology is essential for the operation of each of
the downstream ￿rm￿ s businesses in the industry. Our model generalizes Kamien and
Tauman (1986) in the following two aspects.2 Kamien and Tauman (1986) assume that
the demand function is linear and that the license scheme is a ￿xed fee or a unit royalty.
We consider a model with a general demand function and a general license scheme that
combines the ￿xed fee as well as unit royalty.
1de Meza (1986) considers endogenous entry of licensees. See Table 1 for main assumptions made
in de Meza (1986).
2The situation wherein it is essential for all downstream ￿rms to possess a license holder￿ s tech-
nology is considered. These downstream ￿rms do not possess any alternative (or old) technology for
manufacturing products. This represents a simpli￿ed situation, which is termed as ￿drastic innova-
tion￿by Arrow (1962). He de￿nes that an innovation is drastic if the monopoly price under the new
technology does not exceed the price in perfect competition under the alternative technology. Even if
alternative technology with a modestly higher unit production cost is incorporated in our model for
replicating the non-drastic innovation model, our qualitative analysis remains unchanged.
1Table 1: Main Assumptions
Following Kamien and Tauman (1986), the optimal license scheme for a license
holder has been considered in numerous papers. Kamien (1992) provides a useful survey
on this topic. The existing literature primarily focuses on comparing licensing by means
of a unit royalty and a ￿xed fee.3 Moreover, Sen and Tauman (2007) explore the optimal
combination of a ￿xed fee and a unit royalty. In their model, a ￿xed fee is determined
by auction; thus, the ￿xed fee is the winning bid of licensees. They show that as claimed
by Kamien and Tauman (1986), a ￿xed fee scheme is su¢ cient for monopoly pro￿t and
that the optimal number of licensees is exactly one under a linear demand function.4
Table 1 is provided in order to elucidate the di⁄erences among the main assumptions
of this paper and those of Kamien and Tauman (1986), de Meza (1986), and Sen and
Tauman (2007).5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our model and
Section 3 presents the result. Section 4 discusses the case wherein the ￿xed fee is
regulated. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
3Recently, Ino (2010) extends Kamien and Tauman (1986) by considering the general cost function
and the general demand function. He compares the unit royalty scheme and the ￿xed fee scheme with
a ￿xed number of licensees. He shows that a unit royalty scheme is superior to a ￿xed fee scheme when
the downstream market is su¢ ciently competitive.
4Sen and Tauman (2007) also consider a case wherein the license holders may produce goods
themselves. See also Wang (1998) for further discussion on so-called incumbent license holders, who
sell a license as well as produce goods.
5Note that since de Meza (1986) proves his proposition using only a ￿gure, the assumptions of his
model are deduced from the ￿gure.
22 The Model
Consider a license holder who has innovative technology and n of identical licensees that
produce and sell goods in the retail market. The license holder o⁄ers a licensing scheme
(w;f) to all licensees where w 2 R is a unit royalty, and f 2 R+ is a ￿xed fee. Only
a positive ￿xed fee is assumed in this study. If w = 0 in an optimal contract, a license
holder selects a ￿xed fee scheme. On the other hand, if in an optimal contract contains
both w and f, a license holder selects a two-part tari⁄ scheme.6 Licensee i (= 1;:::;n)
requires the technology of a license holder to produce its product. We assume that all
licensees are identical and produce homogenous goods. If a licensee buys a license, then
it can produce a product with marginal cost c. These identical licensees compete in
quantity.
Given a total output Q, let P(Q) denote market price. We assume that the function
P is di⁄erentiable and that P 0(Q) < 0 and P 0(Q) + QP 00(Q) < 0 for all Q. These are
standard assumptions and the latter one guarantees the stability of equilibrium. The
cost function of licensee i is given by
(c + w)qi + f.
where qi 2 R+ is the output level of licensee i.
The pro￿t of the license holder is given by
￿
L = nf + wQ:
The pro￿t of licensee i (= 1;:::;n) is given by:
￿i = qi(P(Q) ￿ w ￿ c) ￿ f:
As a benchmark, consider a case where a license holder does not sell its technology
and produces goods with his own technology. Obviously, such a license holder will




where qL 2 R+ is the license holder￿ s output. The ￿rst-order condition is P(qL) ￿ c +
P 0qL = 0 and the license holder obtains a pro￿t that is denoted by ￿m
L. Hereafter, the
pro￿t equal to ￿m
L is termed monopoly pro￿t.
This game runs as follows. In the ￿rst stage, the license holder o⁄ers terms (w;f)
to all its potential licensees. We assume that (w;f) is identical for all i. In the second
stage, each licensee decides whether to buy a license and to enter the market. In the
third stage, licensees compete in quantities.
6Note that a negative unit royalty is allowed in this model. A negative unit royalty implies a subsidy
for production. See Liao and Sen (2005) for further discussion on negative unit royalty.
33 Result
We solve this game by backward induction. Given a license scheme (w;f), the licensees
compete in quantities in the third stage. The pro￿t maximization problem of each
licensee i (= 1;:::;n) is as follows:
max
qi
qi(P(Q) ￿ w ￿ c) ￿ f: (1)
The ￿rst-order condition of each licensees i (= 1;:::;n) is given by
P(Q) ￿ c ￿ w + P
0qi = 0: (2)
Note that since we assume that P 0(Q) + QP 00(Q) < 0, the second-order condition is
satis￿ed.
In the second stage, licensees enter the market as long as they can obtain positive
pro￿ts. Thus, we have the following zero-pro￿t condition for each licensee i (= 1;:::;n):
qi(P(Q) ￿ w ￿ c) ￿ f = 0: (3)
In what follows, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all the licensees choose
the same strategies, i.e., qi = q for all i (= 1;:::;n). Now we have the equilibrium
conditions in the second and third stages as follows:
P(Q) ￿ c ￿ w + P
0q = 0; (4)
q(P(Q) ￿ c ￿ w) ￿ f = 0: (5)
Given w and f, let q(w;f) and n(w;f) be the solutions to (4) and (5). Therefore, from
equations (4) and (5), the implicit function theorem implies the following7:
￿
P 0q + q2P 00 P 0 + P 0n + qP 00n













P 0q + q2P 00 P 0n + P 0 + qP 00n



















(P ￿ c ￿ w ￿ qP 0) ￿ nq2P 00









P 0 + nqP 00 + nP 0




q(P 00q + P 0)
(￿(P ￿ c ￿ w)q(P 0 + P 00q)) + q2(P 0)2: (9)
7Since the determinant is (P ￿c￿w)(P0 +wP00)￿q(P0)2 < 0(6= 0), the implicit function theorem
can be applied.
4The assumptions on the demand function and the ￿rst- and second-order conditions
indicate that dn=dw < 0, dn=df < 0 and dq=df > 0. The sign of dq=dw is indeterminate




















Thus, the total output is decreasing in both w and f. Let q￿, Q￿, n￿, w￿ and f￿ denote
the equilibrium output level of each licensee, equilibrium total output, equilibrium
number of licensees, equilibrium unit royalty and equilibrium ￿xed fee, respectively.
In the ￿rst stage, the license holder chooses a (w;f) that maximizes its own pro￿t.
Note that given (w;f;n;q), the license holder￿ s pro￿t is ￿L = n(qw + f). Substituting
the equilibrium condition (5), we can rewrite ￿L as follows:
￿
L = nq(P(nq) ￿ c):





Suppose that the unit royalty is given as w = ￿ w. As an auxiliary step, consider a








P 0(P ￿ c + n￿q￿P 0)
P 0(P ￿ c ￿ ￿ w ￿ P 0q￿) + P 00q￿(P ￿ c ￿ ￿ w)
= 0:
Since it is assumed that P 0 < 0, we have P ￿ c ￿ ￿ w ￿ qP 0 > 0. In addition, according
to the ￿rst- and second-order conditions in the third stage, the denominator, P 0(P ￿




￿) ￿ c + n
￿q
￿P
0 = 0: (10)
Given any ￿ w, the system of equations (4), (5) and (10) determines q￿, Q￿, n￿, and f￿.8
8Note that the second-order condition in the ￿rst stage is satis￿ed. The second-order condition




)2 + (P ￿ c + QP0)
d2Q
df2 < 0;
where Q = nq. Since the ￿rst-order condition in the ￿rst stage implies P ￿ c + QP0 = 0, and
(dQ=df)2 > 0, it can be rewritten as 2P0+QP00 < 0. Thus, since we assume P0+QP00 < 0 and P0 < 0,
the second-order condition is satis￿ed.
5Because n￿q￿ = Q￿, we can rewrite the condition (10) as follows:
P(Q
￿) ￿ c + Q
￿P
0 = 0: (11)
Equation (11) implies that the license holder obtains monopoly pro￿t given ￿ w. Monopoly
pro￿t is the maximum pro￿t for the license holder to obtain under the consumer de-
mand function P. Since monopoly pro￿t is achieved when ￿ w is given, even if the license
holder chooses w in addition to f, the license holder cannot increase its pro￿t more
than monopoly pro￿t. In other words, the following equation holds in this case:
max
f
nq(P(nq) ￿ c) = max
fw;fg
nq(P(nq) ￿ c):
Therefore, two problems, (LP) and (LP￿ ), yield the same pro￿t. Moreover, since we
take ￿ w arbitrarily, a pair of w and f which satis￿es equation (11) must be a solution
to (LP). Now, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When the number of licensees is determined endogenously, a license
holder can earn monopoly pro￿t by o⁄ering any combination of a unit royalty and a
positive ￿xed fee that satis￿es equation (11). Moreover, even if the license holder uses
only a ￿xed fee, it can earn monopoly pro￿t.
Proposition 1 implies that the result of Kamien and Tauman (1986) is robust when
the demand function is general. They show that if the demand function is linear, then
a license holder can earn monopoly pro￿t by setting the ￿xed fee, f, equal to the
monopoly pro￿t, and only one licensee buys the license. Here, we show that even if
we consider general forms of the demand function, the license holder obtains monopoly
pro￿t. In particular, there is an equilibrium wherein the license holder only employs
a ￿xed fee as in the case in Kamien and Tauman (1986). (Note that this is the case
where the license holder chooses w = 0.)
de Meza (1986) considers a two-part tari⁄scheme and incorporates the endogenous
entry of licensees. He shows that the license holder cannot achieve monopoly pro￿t using
a ￿xed fee scheme if the demand function is linear and the marginal cost is increasing.
He argues that if the number of licensees is endogenously determined, a positive unit
royalty must be combined with a ￿xed fee to earn monopoly pro￿t. However, our result
implies that when the marginal cost for production is constant, a ￿xed fee is su¢ cient
for monopoly pro￿t even if the demand function is in general form.9
Note that when alternative inferior technology is freely available, especially when
the unit production cost with this inferior technology is lower than monopoly price, i.e.,
the non-drastic innovation case in Kamien and Tauman (1986) and in other standard
literature, a similar result may be derived. In the non-drastic innovation case, the
equilibrium market price is determined by the unit production cost of the alternative
9Note that in the analysis of de Meza (1986), the equilibrium number of licensees is implicitly
assumed to be greater than one. This may be another reason why a positive unit royalty is necessary.
6technology when the unit production cost is constant. Thus, as in our model above, the
levels of w and f do not a⁄ect the equilibrium market price and total output. Therefore,
the license holder can extract the entire industrial surplus with any combination of w
and f that ensures that the equilibrium market price is equal to the unit production
cost of the alternative technology.
4 Discussion
Proposition 1 implies that when a unit royalty and a ￿xed fee are both available, the
license holder always earns monopoly pro￿t. In what follows, we demonstrate that
monopoly pro￿t is achieved even if the level of ￿xed fee is regulated.
Consider a licensing scheme (w; ￿ f) where w denote the unit royalty, and ￿ f denote
the regulated ￿xed fee.10 From the perspective of the competition policy, excessively
high prices of licenses are occasionally regulated in several countries e.g., Korea. The
policymaker establishes a particular level for ￿ f. Subsequently, given ￿ f, the equilibrium
conditions in the second and third stages are derived as in Section 3. Since the ￿xed
fee is determined by the policy, the equilibrium output level and the equilibrium num-
ber of licensees are functions of w rather than functions of (w;f). Let q￿￿, Q￿￿, n￿￿,
and w￿￿ denote the equilibrium output level of each licensee, equilibrium total output,
equilibrium number of licensees, and equilibrium unit royalty, respectively.
In the ￿rst stage, the license holder chooses w in order to maximize its pro￿t ￿L =
n(qw + ￿ f). Substituting the zero-pro￿t condition, ￿L can be rewritten as follows:
￿
L = nq(P(nq) ￿ c): (12)
This implies that despite the ￿xed fee being determined by regulation, the license
holder￿ s pro￿t is equal to the total industrial pro￿t as in the case of the two-part tari⁄
scheme. Then, the license holder maximizes ￿L with a unit royalty w. Using equations




(P ￿ c + n￿￿P 0q￿￿)(P ￿ c ￿ w￿￿ ￿ P 0q￿￿)
P 0(P ￿ c ￿ w￿￿ ￿ P 0q￿￿) + P 00q￿￿(P ￿ c ￿ w￿￿)
= 0:
Thus, we have the equilibrium condition as follows:
P(Q
￿￿) ￿ c + Q
￿￿P
0 = 0: (13)
The equation (13) yields the following proposition.11
10We assume ￿ f > 0.




)2 + (P ￿ c + QP0)
d2Q
dw2 < 0;
where Q = nq. Since the ￿rst-order condition implies that P ￿c+QP0 = 0, and (dQ=dw)2 > 0, it can
be rewritten as 2P0 + QP00 < 0. Since we assume that P0 + QP00 < 0 and P0 < 0, the second-order
condition is satis￿ed.
7Proposition 2 When the number of licensees is determined endogenously, a license
holder can achieve monopoly pro￿t with a unit royalty scheme that satis￿es equation
(13) despite the level of ￿xed fee being regulated.
This proposition asserts that a policymaker￿ s decision never a⁄ects the equilibrium
outcome. This result contrasts with the case where the number of licensees is exoge-
nously determined. If n is determined as a ￿xed number ￿ n, then the pro￿t of a license
holder is ￿L = ￿ n ￿ f + ￿ nqw, and each licensee may obtain positive pro￿t. Therefore,
the zero-pro￿t condition does not hold and the license holder cannot extract the entire
pro￿t from the market.12
Kamien and Tauman (1986) study the case of a unit royalty scheme as well; however,
they assume that the number of licensees is exogenously given. In the discussion here,
a unit royalty scheme is considered under endogenous entry of licensees. We show that
if any ￿xed cost other than the ￿xed fee, e.g., a set-up cost, does not exist, then the
license holder earns the monopoly pro￿t.
Sen and Tauman (2007) examine the two-part tari⁄ scheme, and show that it is
optimal for a license holder to o⁄er a ￿xed fee that is equal to monopoly pro￿t and to
make only one licensee accept this o⁄er. In this discussion, even if the level of ￿xed
fee is regulated to make it lower than monopoly pro￿t, the license holder can achieve
monopoly pro￿t by o⁄ering an appropriate unit royalty. We can easily understand that
a lower ￿xed fee increases the number of licensees from one. However, the equilibrium
output and equilibrium market price remain unchanged and are determined as the
monopoly level. A license holder obtains the monopoly pro￿t, irrespective of the level
of competition in the downstream market.
5 Concluding Remarks
We considered the licensing scheme of cost-reducing innovation where the number of
licensees is endogenously determined. First, it was shown that as long as the marginal
cost is constant, a ￿xed fee scheme is su¢ cient for a license holder to earn monopoly
pro￿t. Thus, with a constant marginal cost, the result of Kamien and Tauman (1986)
was found to be robust. Second, we analyzed a case with a regulated ￿xed fee. Even if
the license holders cannot choose their ￿xed fees, they can obtain monopoly pro￿t with
the optimal unit royalty wherein the number of licensees is endogenously determined.
This result implies that license holders do not have to determine the number of
licensees that they sell to when a su¢ cient number of potential licensees exist. License
holders are only required to determine the price of their license, and to take open access
policy for their technologies. Any discrimination in the license schemes among licensees
12Note that the zero-pro￿t conditions of licensees are also satis￿ed in the ￿xed fee case of Kamien
and Tauman (1986). A license holder can impose the zero-pro￿t condition on licensees by setting f
equal to monopoly pro￿t.
8or the exclusivity of licenses, which are usually discussed as the anti-competitive as-
pects of license contracts, are not crucial contract conditions for license holders to earn
monopoly pro￿t.
Furthermore, the number of licensees, i.e., the competitiveness of the downstream
market, does not a⁄ect a license holder￿ s pro￿t. Thus, when there is su¢ cient number
of potential licensees under free entry, any regulations that a⁄ect the pricing of licenses
cannot increase or decrease the social welfare. Policymakers must pay attention to the
competitive environment of potential licensees, especially whether or not entry is free,
when they consider interventions.
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